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By Wallace E. Huffman and Robert E. Evenson
^ Duality theory and static multi-product technology have been applied to
' *
I investigate the structure of agricultural technology (e.g.. Weaver; Shuinway;
' McKay et al.). Ttiese studies have provided econometric evidence of the joint-
ness of agricultural technology and new measures of output supply and input
demand elasticities. Although these studies have not emphasized the biases in
farmers' choices caused by public policies, the multi-product framework, pro
vides a rich methodology for exploring them. The multi-product framework can
provide a more complete picture of adjustments to policy than the single
output technology employed by, for example, Antle; Binswanger; Lopez; Houch
and Ryan, Houch and Subotnik; and Nerlove. Furthermore, we can do better Chan
indexing technology with time (see Weaver; Shumway; McKay et al.; Antle).
The primary purpose of this study is (i) Co present new econometric
evidence on the relationships among outputs supplied and inputs demanded by
U.S. multi-product cash grain farms, (ii) to estmate the shadow value of agri
cultural research, extension, and farmers' schooling, and (iii) to assess Che
I biases in farmers* choices caused by public agricultural research and oCher
I policies. These oCher policies include farmers' schooling, agricultural
extension, and farm commodity programs. Dual relationships, based upon a
flexible profit function, are employed to derive a set of supply and demand
functions and to devise measures of policy induced biases in outputs supplied
and inputs demanded. The estimates are obtained from jointly fitting a system
of 7 equations Co daCa for 42 U.S. sCaCes pooled over census years 1948-1974.
LThese equations are adjusted for selectivity bias because the cash-grain farm
type is an endogenous type classification. The results show that strong
biases have been caused in outputs supplied and inputs demanded by public
policy.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The first section presents the
economic and econometric models of production. In the second section, the
empirical analyses, which contains a discussion of the data and empirical
results, are presented and interpreted. Conclusions and implications for
future research are in the final section.
The Economic and Econometric Ifodel of Production
Agriculture in the United States is a highly competitive industry, and we
assume that the objective of farm firms is best described by maximization of
expected profit. Although there is no doubt that farmers are price takers in
input and output markets, some evidence exists that farmers are risk adverse
and that household and farm resource allocation decisions are joint. Evidence
.in favor of risk aversion include Just, Behrman, and Binswanger, but' others
have shown that the same results could be consistent with profit maximization
(Gardner and Chavas; Pope),^ Farm production decisions are separable from
household consumption decisions when prices of variable farm inputs are deter~
mined in the market (Barnum and Squire). In.this study the assumption of
profit maximizing competitive behavior of farmers is maintained.
The Economic Model
Consider the production decisions of a multi-product firm making choices
on n+m+1 net outputs y^ (Lau 1976). They supply n+1 outputs (y^>0, i=0,.,,,n)
and employ mvariable inputs (y^<0, i=n+l,...,n+ra). There are q fixed or
environmental factors, including governmental policies, that are denoted by
2 >0, il?=l,. . . ,q. Denote P_ as the numeraire price, which could be set equal
to 1, and define the normalized expected price of outputs and inputs as
Pi = P^/Pq» i=l,...,n+ra. All p^ are positive.
With competitive behavior and regular technology, a one-to-one relation
ship exists between the technology and its dual transformation, the normalized
restricted profit function (Nadiri, Diewert 1973, Lau 1976). Although the
characteristics of the technology can be examined directly through the primal
approach or indirectly by the dual formulation, the dual approach is computa
tionally easier to manipulate, it yields a set of choice functions that are
determined by variables that are exogenous to firms, and it permits a wider
range of hypotheses to be tested. The normalized restricted profit function,
hereafter called the profit function, is
(1) TT = G(p,z)
where it is a firm's normalized variable profit, i.e., nominal profit deflated
by Pq, P and z are vectors of the n+m normalized prices and q fixed and
environmental factors, respectively, and "G is the profit function. The profit
function is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, convex, and
monotonic in p and z. Applying Hotelling's leirana, the system of (profit
maximizing) output supply and input demand functions are directly obtained by
differentiating the profit function with respect to p:
8 G ^(2) = y^ (p,z), i=l,...,n+m.
The shadow value' equations for the q fixed and environmental factors
be obtained. The shadow value, represented as the total effect on profit, is
obtained by differentiating the profit function with respect to z^^ (Nadari,
p. 452; Diewert 1974, p. 140):
= 5^ - X
\ 3z, k^3) ^1, ^ , (p,z) , k=l, .. . ,q
where X, is the shadow price of z, , The effects of z, on profit through
k . . k k
decisions on current inputs and outputs is
n* 3y*
(3') = S p^ (p.z), k=l,...,q.
i=l k
This equation (3*) represents the shadow value measured as the effects of
on the "variable components" of profit, and equation (3)' represents the effect
of on profit through its effect on current choices and residual returns to
fixed factors and governmental policy. The optimal choice and the shadow
price equations are functions of the normalized prices associated with current
choices and the fixed and environmental factors, including governmental
policies (Lau 1976).
The Econometric Model
To obtain a reasonable set of supply and input demand equations and to
permit examination of the biases in production choices caused by public
policy, a flexible functional form for the profit function is sufficient
(Diewert 1973; Fuss, McFadden, Mundlak). An equation that is a second-order
Taylor's approximation to any arbitrary functional form is termed flexible
(Diewert 1973). Flexible functional forms that have been employed by others
include the translog (Weaver; McKay et al.; Antle), normalized quadratic
(Shumway; Lopez 1985), and generalized Leontief (Evenson and Binswanger).
The normalized quadratic function is employed in this study. It imposes
homogeneity in prices, is self dual, and has a Hessian matrix of constants
(Lau 1974, 1976), Also, choice functions are linear in unknown parameters,
and net output functions are linear in the normalized prices.
The normalized quadratic profit function is:
n* q
(4) ,11 = 4. _Z a.p. + s
1—1 K 1.
n* n* q q
•^ ii/.L '"'''I *ului.
n* q
^ikTk'
i=lk=l
where n* - n+m/and as. $s, Ys, and 5s are Che unknown parameters of the
profit function. The net output equations, with random disturbance terms
added, for the n+m current choices are:
(5) y* =«i + ^ PijPj + ^ik^k ^"i* "*•
j=l k«l
The equation for the numeraire output must be obtained residuaLly from the
parameters of the other n+ra net supply equations:
n* n*
yo = "o - 2
The random disturbance term (p^) of each supply/demand equation is
assumed to be homoscedastic, uncorrelated, and normally distributed. Because
these production decisions are affected by similar shocks, contemporaneous
cross-equation correlation of the disturbances in the n+m equations is likely
and is permitted.
Because the profit function is assumed to be twice continuously differ-
entiable, its partial derivatives are invariant to the order of differentia
tion. Given that the net supply equations are first derivatives of the profit
function, the slopes of the net supply equations are the second partial
derivatives. The cross-equation symmetry conditions, i.e., 3^^ = 3^^,
j=l,...,n+ra, are imposed to reduce the number of unknown parameters to be
estimated and to ease the burden imposed on the data.
The responsiveness of choices to changes in exogenous variables is
rsuimnarized in the elasticities. The elasticity of net output supply of y*^
with respect to the normalized price p^ is designated
2 "*....n+m, and Hqj =' " (Pj/Pg ^0^ ^ij^i' J-'O, -•-.n+m. Convexity of the
profit function implies- that the own-price elasticity of output supply is
expected to be positive and of input demand is expected to be negative.
Cross-price elasticities can be positive, negative, or zero. If y^ and y^ are
outputs or inputs, i and j are designated "substitutes" when n^ 0 and
"complements" when < 0. The elasticity of net supply with respect to the
fixed or environmental factor is ~ i=l,...,n+m, and
k=l,...,q.
The shadow value equations for the fixed and environmental factors
associated with the normalized quadratic profit function are as follows. The
shadow value, showing total effects on profit, is
^ 1^-1.•••.I-
k il»l i«l
The shadow value, showing effects on variable inputs and outputs, is
n* 3 y^r n*
(7") = Z p. ^ = I Y.. p. .
k . - 8 z, . , ik 1
i«l k 1=1
Given estimates for 6 , ^ , and y. , the shadow value equations can be
K K/v XK
evaluated at the sample mean of p and z. If the marginal (social or private)
cost of z is available, then the shadow price (X,) and marginal cost of z
Ic R K
can be compared. If they are not significantly different, then is on
average at the long-run "equilibrium" level (Nadari, Shankerman).
Several measures of biases induced by technical change or other nonprice
factors have been used in the literature. The Hicksian measure, based upon
marginal rates of technical substitution (transformation), has the disadvan
tage that biases must be measured between every pair of net outputs. When
there is a large number of outputs and inputs, this set of calculations is
difficult to summarize. Furthermore, for nonhomeothetic functions, the key
issue is how the "expansion path" changes as technology changes.
Antle proposes a single net measure of the bias in each choice caused by
a change in technology. Although he employs a translog profit function and
J single output technology, his methodology is adopted here to obtain a net
> summary measure of the bias induced in choice y^ relative to other choices in
the multi-product multi-input technology. The dual implicit transformation
function F(y.,.,.,y ,z.,,..,z ) = 0 can be solved in unsymmetric form for
0 n+m i q
any net output, say y^, y^ = f^(yj^.... ,y^^.z^ ,..., z^) , Diewert 1973, pp.
286-287. This gives maxintum output y^ as a function of the other n+m net
outputs and the k fixed or environmental factors. This function need not be
homothetic. Let the i-th elasticity of transformation be
3f n*
f-. = T—— , E.<0 for y.>0 and e.>0 for y.<0, and define e ® E e.. Now use
Oi 8y. * X •' X 1 •'i ' 1 1-
i.= l
the transformation elasticity share e^/e to define the bias caused by z^.
When 2 changes, it causes bias toward (against) output i or against
input i when F. = 9 In (E./e)/9 In z, , k = l,...,q, is (less) greater than
LK 1 K
zero. The change in z is neutral with respect to net output i when r., = 0.
K 1>K
Note that for the profit maximizing competitive equilibrium e^/e = -
t where it* = ^i^^ value of y^ relative to profit (it*). Thus,
the bias induced by and represented by an increase in or implies
that the value of y or "share" has risen relative to profit it*. Furthermore,
n* *
e«SE.«=l - • - , When firms are in competitive equilibrium, F. can be
i=l ^
used to evaluate the change in farmer's choices on net outputs that are
I
induced by z. .
k
For any z^, can be expressed as a linear function of the profit
function's parameters at a data point... Thus, the (and their standard
errors) can be computed and used to test for Hicksian type neutral bias caused
by z , Nadiri (p. 453) and Lau show that ^ ln-G(p,z) _ _ e./i-e.
8 In p.
Therefore, e/(l-e) = + T, e. = - 2 and
e^/e =
e .
1
(1-e)
1-e
n* n*
1 « , - _ r 8 1" G
i=i ^ i=i ^ Pi
8 In G / n*
d In G
. I
9 In p. V . , 8 In p.
*^1 \ 1=1 *^1/
9 In G n*
-1
9 In (e./e)
Then, T. = -5— i = 9 In
ik 9 in z.
9 In G
/ 29 In p. . - 9 in p.
1=1 '^i.
= 9 In
9 In z.
n*
k
3 In G
9 In p.
*^1
n*
i=l
9 In
n*
i i=l
9 In z.
n*
9 In G
. , 9 In p.
1=1 1
9 In z,
I k
n* y^
•' 1Because Z e./e = 1, a weighted average of the T. s, i.e., Z T.
i=l ^ i=l ^^i
n*
equals zero when the weights are y./ Z y.. Thus, for the normalized
^ i=l ^
quadratic profit function, equation (8) contains the statement of the net bias
induced by a change in the fixed or environmental factor z . The fixed factor
Iv
has a strictly Hicks neutral bias on all choices if " 0 for all i.
These derived parameters are of central interest in this study, and estimates
of the bias for agricultural outputs have not been reported in the literature
before.
The Empirical Analyses
A set of seven equations for output supply and input demand functions are
to be jointly fitted to data for 42 U.S. states pooled over the six census
3
years 1948-1974. the parameter estimates of these equations are used to
derive the estimates of elasticities of supply and demand and the estimates of
biasedness of U.S. public policy on farmers' production decisions.
The Data
The data are for cash grain farms in 42 U.S. states derived from the six
; • 4 ,
''» Agricultural Censuses between 1949 and 1974. Farms in the past have been
classified into 6-8 major types based upon the primary source(s) of ^arm
sales, e.g., cash grain, general livestock, dairy, cotton, farms in any one
of these type classes can be expected to have more similar technology than all
farms. Cash grain farms represent a large and increasing share of U.S. farm
types except for the New England region. Thus, the New England states are
excluded from our analysis and the remaining 42 states in the contiguous 48
states are Included.
The current choices of cash grain farmers are condensed into seven major
aggregate (per farm) quantity indexes. There are four variable inputs:
fertilizer (commercial), fuel, machinery services, and labor (farmer and
hired) and three outputs: wheat, soybeans, and feed grains (corn, grain,
sorghum, oats, barley). These are the major outputs of cash grain farms, and
we have chosen to ignore a large number of outputs (e.g., livestock, cotton,
tobacco, vegetables, fruits) that are of secondary importance on these farms.
The independent variables for explaining these choices are the expected
product prices, current variable input prices, and fixed and environmental
factors, including research., extension, education, and farm commodity
policies.
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Considerable work went into constructing the empirical measures of the
quantities and prices for agricultural outputs and inputs. The quantity of
fertilizer was derived by dividing expenditures on fertilizer (U.S. Dept.
Comm.) by a state level weighted price index. The state price index was
obtained by applying state quantity weights to national average prices for the
primary nutrients N, P, and K. Separate prices were derived for nutrients
obtained from mixed grade and single nutrient fertilizers. The raw price data
are in Agricultural Prices. Regression analysis was employed to obtain
estimates of the prices of individual nutrients of multi-nutrient fertilizers.
Prices for separate components were weighted by expenditure shares. The price
of fertilizer, the independent variable, is the one-year lagged state-level
price of the composite fertilizer quantity.
The quantity of fuel for agricultural use was derived by dividing
expenditures on gasoline, diesel fuel, LP gas, and oil and grease (U.S. Dept.
Comm.) by a state-level weighted fuel price. The state fuel price index was
obtained by weighting state-level prices (Agricultural Prices) of the three
basic components by expenditure shares for the USDA agricultural production
region in which the state is located. Regional expenditure shares for 1964
were applied in earlier years. The petroleum price, the independent variable,
is the one year lagged state price of the composite fuel quantity.
The quantity of machinery services is the implicit rental for an
arbitrary set of machines on farms plus expenditures on machine hire. The set
of machines is limited to ones reported in the Census of Agriculture, i.e.,
farm trucks, wheel and crawler tractors, balers, combines, corn pickers, and
forage harvesters. The size distribution (four types) of wheel tractors was
estimated based upon the size distribution of farms. The implicit rental in
11
n
year t on owned machines is computed as £ p^^ ^^t^'^it^ ^it
i=l
"new price" of the i-th type of machine in year t, is the number of
^ machines of type i in year t, r^ is the PCAs annual average interest rate on
.* loans outstanding (Agricultural Statistics), and d^ is the straight line
depreciation rate on the i-th type of machine (Hunt; Am. Society of Agr.
I' . . • . .I Engineers). The "new prices" of machines were derived from prices of machines
j reported in the Official Tractor and Farm Equipment Guides. The price of
machine services, the independent variable, is ^^t-l^^t^ where is the
wholesale price index for agricultural machinery and equipment at the begin
ning of t (U.S. Dept. of Labor), and d^ is the weighted average depreciation
irate for the set of machines on farms.
The farm labor input is measured as the annual hours of farm operator and
hired labor employed on farms. Farm operators were assumed to work an average
of 300 days per year at on-farm and off-farm work combined and to work an
average of 8 hours per day at farm and off-farm work. Farm operators who were
65 years of age or older were assumed to work only half as many hours as
younger operators. Annual hours of farm operator labor is derived as: [300
da/yr - ave. no. of off-farm work days per farm opr. (U.S. Dept. Comm) x (8
hrs/da) x (no. of farm opr. < age 65) + 1/2 x no. of opr. > age 651. Annual
I . hours of hired labor are derived as annual expenditures on hired labor plus
} expenditures on contract labor (U.S. Dept. Comm.) divided by the state average
annual hourly farm wage (Farm Labor). The wage rate for hired farm labor is
arbitrarily assumed to be the marginal cost of operator employed farm labor.
, '9 t
» Thus, the wage rate for farm labor, the independent variable, is the state
average wage rate for hired labor lagged one year.
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The bushels of grain harvested were used to construct measures of the
outputs of wheat, soybeans, and feed grains. The feed grain quantity index is
a Fisher-quantity index constructed using the quantities of corn, oats,
^ barley, and grain sorghum harvested (U.S. Dept. Comm.) and state average
prices received for the commodities (Agr. Prices). The expected output
prices, the dependent variable, are the average closing futures market prices
in the planting month for harvest month contracts, adjusted for state differ
ences in average transportation costs.^ The planting months are March or
April, except for winter wheat where it is September. The (expected) feed
grain price is the numeraire price in the empirical analysis, and the other
output and input prices are divided by it.
Fixed factors that affect output/input choices are the land stock, pre
season precipitation, and time trend. The land stock is measured in constant
quality units as a price weighted quantity index of five land-use types on
cash-grain farms (U.S. Dept. Comm.). The weights are fixed for all years.
Relative weights were taken from Hoover and expressed at the 1949 average
.land-price levels (U.S. Dept. Comm.). Preseason precipitation is known at
planting time, and it is measured as the total of the state average precipita
tion received during the months of October through March before planting. The
trend and trend squared are included to remove the effects of unmeasured
variables that are correlated with time and that otherwise might cause
spurious estimates of coefficients of included variables."
The policy variables are (public) agricultural research, extension,
farmers' education, and feed grain and wheat program variables. The agricul
tural research variable is constructed as the summation of expenditures over,
previous years on applied crop, applied livestock, and basic research in
public sector agricultural experiment stations from data on past commodity-
•/ i
-•M
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specific public agricultural research expenditure data (Evenson 1978). For
each state, these variables represent both indigenous research and borrowable
research from other states located in similar geoclimatic regions. The agri
cultural extension variable is the one-year lagged value of a state's total
expenditures on agricultural extension.
Schooling of farmers may have allocative as well as general efficiency
effects on production (Welch 1970; Huffman 1977). The schooling level of cash
grain farmers is proxied by a Welch-type weighted (Welch 1966, 1970) average
number of years of schooling completed by all farmers in a state (U.S. Dept.
Comm.) .
The government farm program for commodities may be primarily income
transfer programs (Gardner 1983). They, also, may have resource allocation
effects. The government program variables are rather crude. They concentrate
on the loan rate but ignore acreage restrictions. They are derived as
(p /P- )D , where p.is the normalized price of the i-th output, i=5 (wheat),
X 111 X X
7(feed grains); P . is the national average loan rate (Cochrane and Ryan) for
IjX
wheat (i=5) and for corn (i=7); is a dummy variable taking the value of
1 if output i is produced, and 0 otherwise. To the extent that these programs
have resource allocation effects, the coefficient of the wheat program
variable is expected to be negative in the wheat supply equation, and the
coefficient of the feed grain program variable is expected to be negative in
the feed-grains supply equation.
A few other variables are included in the output supply and input demand
equations. First, the share of the farm operators that are 65 years of age or
older is included to represent the effects of partial retirement and possible
short-term planning horizon of older farmers on production decisions. Second,
the three outputs are not always produced by cash grain farmers in all 42
f '
i
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states. In particular, the number of states in which soybeans are produced
(by cash grain farms) is rather small in 1948, and although the number of
states in which farmers produce soybeans increases over time, only 65 percent
of the 42 states have positive quantities of soybeans harvested by cash grain
farmers. In all supply/demand equations, variables are added to permit the
intercept and coefficients of the normalized soybean and wheat prices to
differ for corner and interior solutions on these respective choices. This is
a crude attempt to incorporate structural change due to production choices.
The sample means of all variables are reported in Table 1.
Econometric Estimation
The set of equations (5) are estimated by 3-stage least squares subject
to within and cross-equation restrictions and to the predicted value of a
farm-type selectivity variable.^ The coefficients sre estimated at a
later stage. Given estimates of a., 6... and Y., » residual profit if:ty l' ij ' ik
n* n* n* ^ n* q ^
(9) =ir - r S^p. Z t $ p.p - Z S 9.j^p.z^
i«l i=lj»l - i=lk=l
' «0 ^
Consistent estimates of the . s can be obtained by applying least squares to
KA
equation (9), after adding a zero mean disturbance term.^ Farms are type
classified based upon observed farm output or sales. A farm is classified as
a cash grain farm if 30 percent or more of total farm sales are due to sales
of grains (U.S. Dept. of Comm. 1977). Observed farm output or sales is the
result of production decisions and random shocks to technology and prices.
Thus, the probability that a farm is classified as a cash grain farm depends
15
on p and z (Huffman 1983), Thus, E(u^/the farm type classification rule) * 0,
and the least-squares estimator for equation (5) will be statistically
inconsist.ent (Heckman). To purge the aggregate supply and demand equations of
selectivity bias, we add a new variable which is the predicted relative
frequency of (not) observing cash grain farms,.
Within and cross-equation restrictions are to be imposed in the estima
tion process. The cross-equation restrictions are the symmetry conditions,
S.. = S... The within equation restrictions arise from restricting the
J3-
coefficient of the normalized price of soybeans (wheat) to being zero in all
supply and demand equations when soybeans (wheat) are not produced.
Because of the cross-equation restrictions and the possible contemporan
eous correlation of disturbance terms in the supply and demand equations, the
choice functions must be estimated jointly as one system. The restricted
three-stage least squares estimator is consistent and efficient, conditional
on the farm type selectivity variable. This estimator is employed here.
Estimates of the Product Supply and Input Demand Equations
Estimates of the parameters of the seven equations, derived from the
normalized quadratic profit function and fitted to the 296 pooled observations
for U.S. cash grain farms, are reported in Table 2. All own-price coeffi
cients have the expected sign, except for the coefficient of machinery
services, and most are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent
g
level. The coefficient of machinery services is not, however, significantly
different from zero at the 5 percent level. The coefficients of the fixed
factors are plausible. Increasing the average land input per farm causes the
quantity of all variable inputs demanded and all outputs supplied to increase,
except for soybeans supplied. Greater preseason precipitation increases the
quantity of machinery services demanded and the quantity of wheat and soybeans
supplied but reduces the quantity of fertilizer (not significant), fuel, and
16
labor demanded and of feed grains supplied. Also, as the share of older
farmers (> age 65) increases, the demand for all inputs and supply of wheat
and soybeans are reduced. The fuel, machinery, and soybean choice functions
have statistically significant cash-grain farm-type selectivity effects.
Implied output supply and input demand elasticities, evaluated at sample
means, are reported in Table 3. The own-price elasticities of input demand
are inelastic and of output supply are elastic. The own price elasticity for
fertilizer is -0.79, fuel is -0.60, and labor is -0.66. The own-price elasti
city of demand for machinery services is small (0.07), and it has the wrong
sign. The own-price supply elasticities are relatively large. The implied
supply elasticity for wheat is 0.79, for soybeans is 1.63, and for feed grains
is 2,25.
The results contain a diverse set of cross-price effects. Among inputs,
a majority of the cross-price elasticities are positive, implying that inputs
are substitutes. Labor and machinery services are substitutes; labor and
fertilizer and labor and fuel are complements. Also, machinery services and
fuel are substitutes, and the elasticity is large. Among outputs, they are
all complements, except for feed grains and soybeans, which seem to be
9 * ...
substitutes on cash grain farms. These output cross-price elasticities are
relatively elastic, being larger than one in absolute value.
When the wage rate is increased, the quantity supplied of all three
(crop) outputs is reduced. The size of these elasticities range from -0.27
for soybeans to —0.63 for feed grains. Increases in the other input prices is
surprisingly associated with increased quantities supplied of the three out
puts. When the wheat price increases, the quantity of all inputs demanded is
decreased, except for labor which is essentially unchanged. The wheat price
"elasticity of fertilizer is a large -1.1. An increase in the price of soy-
17
beans decreases the demand for fuel; an increase in the price of feed grains
I
increases the demand for fertilizer. The cross-price elasticities are -0.53
and 1.29, respectively. An increase in the soybean price increases the demand
for fuel but an increase in the feed grains price reduces it. An increase in
the feed grains price increases the demand for machinery services, having an
elasticity of -0.13.
For U.S. cash grain"farms, the estimates of the shadow values for the
fixed factors and policy variables, evaluated at the sample mean values are
reported in Table 4. These are obtained by evaluating equations (7) and
(7').*~^ The shadow value of land is negative, both its effect on variable
i ^
profit and total profit. These results imply that profits of a farm with
sample mean characteristics will be increased $19 for each $100 reduction in
the stock of (constant quality) land. The shadow value of land is increased.
when normalized input prices, normalized price of soybeans, agricultural
extension, and preseason precipitation decline, but it is increased when the
normalized prices of wheat, stock of agricultural research, and fanners*
schooling increase. An increase in the CCC loan rate on feed grains increases
the shadow value, but an increase in the CCC loan rate for wheat reduces it.
Furthermore, the marginal effect of time is to reduce the shadow value of
land.
A marginal inch of preseason precipitation (per year) reduces variable
profit by $142 per year but increases total profit by $295 per year. An
increase of the normalized price of fertilizer and machinery services reduces
the variable profit shadow value of preseason precipitation, but an increase
in the other input prices and output prices increases it. An increase of the
stock of land, stock of agricultural research, extension, arid farmers*
schooling reduces the total profit shadow value of preseason precipitation.
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The marginal effect of time is to increase the shadow value of preseason
precipitation.
Public agricultural research and extension increase variable profit but
reduce total profits of cash grain farms. The following changes raise the
shadow value of agricultural research througH effects on variable profit: A
lower normalized price of fertilizer, fuel, labor, and wheat, and higher
machinery service and soybean prices. Additional effects on total profits are
that a larger land stock, agricultural extension input and CCC loan rates for
feed grains and wheat but lower preseason precipitation, schooling level of
farmers, increase the shadow value of agricultural research. The marginal
effect of time on the shadow value of agricultural research is positive but
diminishing. The results show that increasing a state's stock of agricultural
research by 1 percent ($16,800) increases variable profit by an average of
$2.05 per farm. With an average of 10,000 cash-grain farms per state (1974),
the increment in research increases profits of cash grain farms by $20,500 per
state per year. On the other hand, total profits of cash grain farms are
reduced. This is due to a general decline in the economic resits accruing to
fixed factors and policy.
Increasing a state's agricultural extension expenditures by 1 percent
($48,300) per year increases variable profits of cash grain farms by $76 per
farm per year or $152,000 per state on 10,000 cash grain farms. Total profits
of cash grain farms are, however, reduced. The following changes raise the
shadow value of agricultural extension through effects on variable profit:
higher normalized prices for fertilizer, machinery services, fuel, and
soybeans, and lower prices for labor and wheat. Additional effects on total
profit are that a larger agricultural research stock, lower schooling level of
P i
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farmers, smaller land stock, and lower preseason precipitation raise the
shadow value of extension.
In contrast to agricultural research and extension, farmers' schooling
has a negative effect on variable profit but a positive effect on total
profit. The negative effect of schooling on variable profit is due primarily
to the large increase in the machinery input (cost) that is caused by an
increase in farmers* schooling. (Other effects on profits are small.) The
positive effect on total profit arises primarily from a large positive
coefficient on the schooling variable in the fitted equation for profit.
A larger agricultural research stock and agricultural extension input reduce
the shadow value of farmers* schooling. The marginal effect of time is to
increase the shadow value of farmers' schooling. Increasing farmers'
schooling by 10 percent (a .14 change of the index) causes variable profit to
be reduced by $1,153 per year but total^profit increases by $1,518 per year.
If the CCC loan rate for feed grain and wheat are increased, then
marginal changes of variable farm profits and the shadow value of feed grain
commodity programs are negative. The shadow value of the increase in the
wheat loan rate is positive.
The empirical results provide estimates of the average bias in farmers'
choices on outputs and variable inputs that are induced by a change in
government policy or fixed factors. These estimates are obtained by
evaluating equation (8) and are reported in Table 5. They show that the
effects of agricultural research on choices of cash grain farmers, 1948-74,
have been biased in favor of fertilizer, fuel, labor and wheat but against
soybeans. The bias in favor of wheat is especially large. The effects of
agricultural research on machinery service demanded is essentially neutral.
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Agricultural extension has caused biases in favor of labor and wheat, but
against fertilizer and soybeans. Extension has had a relatively neutral
effect on fuel and machinery choices.
Farmers* schooling has caused a large bias in favor of soybeans and to a
lesser extent machinery services. Higher schooling levels have caused biases
against fertilizer, fuel, labor, and wheat. Thus, the biases in farmers'
choices that are attributed to agricultural research, extension, and farmers'
schooling are quite different.
The biases induced in choices of cash grain farmers' choices that are due
to the government feed grain and wheat programs seem to be rather small.
Lowering the loan rate for feed grain (an increase in the feed grain program
variable) causes small biases in favor of fuel, labor, and soybeans but
C
against all other variable inputs and outputs. Lowering the loan rate for
wheat causes a small bias in favor of all current choices, except labor.
Since we do not have other results to compare these biases to, they must be
taken at face value as new evidence.
The fixed factors, land and preseason precipitation, cause biases, too.
A larger land input causes biases in favor of fertilizer, fuel, labor, and
soybeans, but against the other choices. Greater preseason precipitation
biases decisions in favor of machinery and against other current inputs and
outputs of cash grain farms.
Conclusion
This study has presented new econometric evidence on the relationships
among outputs supplied and inputs demanded by U.S. multi-product cash grain
farms, on shadow'prices or returns to fixed factors and government policies
(research, extension, farmers' education and government farm programs), and on
biases in farmers' choices on variable inputs and outputs that are induced by
t21
the fixed factors and policy variables.
Our results show that production on these farms is joint rather than
separate production functions for each output. An increase in agricultural
research and extension is shown to increase profit due to decisions on current
outputs and inputs but to reduce total profit, which includes economic rents
« to fixed factors and governmental policies. Agricultural research is shown to
have a bias in favor of fertilizer, fuel, and labor inputs and wheat output.
It has been neutral on the machinery input and induced a bias against soybean
output. On the other hand, farmers' education has induced biases in favor of
machinery and soybeans but against fertilizer, fuel, labor, and wheat.
Government farm program effects on choices are shown to be quite weak. Addi
tional work is needed to fully comprehend the implications of the relatively
large number of new results.
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Footnotes
The authors are Professor of Economics, Iowa State University and Yale
University, respectively. We wish to thank Willis Peterson, Mark Shankerraan,
Arne Hallam and Richard Shumway for helpful comroents. We received financial
assistance from the USDA-CSRS and the Iowa Agriculture Experiment Station.
Journal Paper No. 5 of the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment
Station, Ames, Iowa. Project 2516,
^Farmers face at least two major sources of uncertainty. Those sources
are uncertain weather conditions and output prices at the tiioe that production
plans are made. The assumption employed here is that these events are uncor-
related and that farmers are risk neutral. At planning time, farmers are
assumed to substitute expected values, conditional on available information,
for unknown values of weather and output prices.
2 ...
The profit function is convex if its matrix of cross-partial derivatives
[ir..] is positive semi-definite or all its characteristic roots are positive
or zero.
3
We have proposed a theoretical model of farm level behavior and are
planning to fit this model to aggregate average data. There are a number of
potential problems with this approach, including the possibility that prices
of choice variables are not exogenous to a group (e.g., cash grain) of
farmers. Even if a number of complications exist, the estimated supply and
demand equations are useful for economic analyses. However, inferences about
the underlying transformation function might be limited.
The five-year interval between successive Censuses of Agriculture reduce
the number of observations available on each state from what annual data would
provide. Annual data are not available for farms by type, only for all
farms.
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^Although there is not uniform agreement about the appropriate output
prices to use, the futures' markets efficiently incorporate information,
Gardner (1978) has shown that own price elasticities of supply are much larger
when futures prices are used rather than one-year lagged actual prices.
^The estimated coefficients of the demand and supply equation may be
affected by the choice of the equation to delete. To obtain the maximum
likelihood estimator, which is invariant to the equation dropped, the 3~state
least squares estimator must be iterated to convergence.
'^ In principle, the coefficients of the profit equation and of the supply
and demand equations could be estimated jointly. The profit equation,
however, contains 1A5 more coefficients than the combined number in the supply
and demand equations. This increases the cost and likelihood that a joint
estimation procedure will fail.
g
The Hessian matrix fails the test for convexity. This is primarily due
to the wrong sign for the own-price effect of farm machinery.
9 . . .
A test of the null hypothesis that outputs are separable from inputs is
rejected. A test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the soybean
price in the wheat supply equation (and of the wheat price in the soybean
supply equation) is zero can be rejected. The sample F is 6.36. The critical
F value with 4 and 1610 degrees of freedom at the 5 percent significance level
is 2.02. Thus, joint production is an appropriate specification.
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estimated coefficients (145 of them) for the fitted residual profit
equation are not reported here, but they are available from the authors. The
2
R for the fitted equation is 0.77. Because of the large number of inter
action effects included as regressors, a large share of the estimated
coefficients have small t-ratios. However, a test of the null hypothesis that
the coefficients on all the cross-product terms were jointly equal to^zero was
soundly rejected. Several other less restrictive null hypotheses were also
rejected.
ri, I
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Table 1, Sample Mean Value of Quantities, Prices, and Other Variables: U.S,
Cash Grain Farms, 42 States, 1949-1974
Variables
Quantities
Fertilizer
Fuel.
Machinery
Labor
VHieat
Soybeans
Feedgrains
Normalized prices
Fertilizer
Fuel
Machinery
Labor
Wheat
Soybeans ,
Feedgrains—
Other
, Land
Preseason precipitation
Agricultural research
Extension
Education
Feedgrain program
Wheat program
Share farm opr 5: age 65
Selectivity
Numeraire price,.
Unit
Index qty/yr
Index qty/yr
$/yr
Hours/yr
Bu/yr
Bu/yr
Bu/yr
$/index qty
$/index qty
$/hr
Expected $/bu
Expected $/bu
Expected $/bu
$/farm
inches/season
Index $,
$/yr
Index/farm opr,
$/bu.
$/bu.
Unit free
Unit free
Mean
-1.571
-0.918
-15454.5
-2531.9
3.462
1.487
4.660
0.848
1.014
1.698
1.138
0.938
1.061
a/
1.217
40,075.0
15.6
16814.9
4826.9
1.390-
0.352
0.629
0.117
0.834
0.06b
0.345.
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Tahlo*. 2. Tliree-Stngo LonHt SininrcH nutJiimte oC SysLom of AggrcRatc I'roduct Supply.^.
Olid Input Ucinnml Functional l]*S. Cnnli Crnln Farnm, A2 States, 1949-1974—
Dcinniul lii|(iritlniin (y£<U)
Variable Fertiliser Fuel Hnchlncry ],nbor
Norninllzccl I'rlces:
Supply Eqtiations (yi^O)
Fectl-
Wlicnt Soybean Rtaln
Ft:rtlllzcr 1.538 -0.476 -0.253 0.112 1.937 -0.230 7.074
(2.98) (2.69) (0.80) (0.27) (2.97) (0.49) (2.49)
Fuel -0.476 0.561 -0.640 0.749 0.282 0.455 2.966
(2.69) (2.07) (4.57) (4.36) (1.15) (2.46) (0.62)
Machinery -0.253 -0.640 -625.4 -919.7 2.465 0.555 1.373
(0.00) (4.57) (0.57) (5.42) (2.04) (0.02) (0.63)
Labor 0.112 0.749 -919.7 1500.6 -1.241 -0.364 -2.466
(0.27) (4.36) (5.42) (7.00) (0.83) (0.42) (0.94)
Ubcnt' 1.937 0.282 2.465 -1.241 2.704 -4.991 • -5.897
(2.97) (1.15) (2.04) (0.83) (1.16) (4.40) (1.40)
Soybean -0.230 0.455 0.555 -0.364 -4.991 2.290 -12.396
(0.49) (2.46) (0.82) (0.42) (4.40) (2.16) (3.04)
Ulicat X D, -1.937 -0.202 -2.465 1.241 -2.704 4.991 5.897
i
(2.97) (1.15) (2.04) (0.03) (1.16) (4.40) (1.40)
Soybean x I)., 0.230 -0.455 -0.555 0.364 4.991 -2.298 12.397
I
(0.49) (2.46) (0.82) (0.42) (4.40) (2.16) (3.84)
Fixed Factors:
Land 1.62k10"
•5 -1.07x10"•5 -0.109 -0.020 1.39x10"
•5 -1.89x10"^ 7.90x10"*'
(9.52) (15.26) (13.04) (21.69) (2.09) ' (0.05) (7.51)
I'rcai'ason
precipita
-0.240tion •4.45x10"
• J
0.017 -90,66 10.64 0.120 0.069
(0.59) (5.48) (2.48) (2.50) (4.00) (4.23) (5.13)
Time 0.482 0.106 2067.3 429.51 -0.902 0.500 -1.318
(1.39) (0.75) (1.28) (2.25) (0.66) (0.67) (0.62)
• Tlme^ -0.171 -0.046 -1164.9 -71.73 0.266 -0.036' 0.492
(2.52) (1.64) (4.31) (1.95) (0.99) (0.25) (1.17)
Policy:
t c
Af»r. •1.91x10"
•5 -4.47x10*•6 0.068 '•7.01x10"•^-1.20x10" •4 1.84x10"^ 1.81x10"'
research (3.05) (1.74) (2.46) (0.21) (5.01) (1.38) (4.68)
l^xtenslon 2.33x10"
•5 6.93x10'
•6
0.100 -0.011 -0.10x10"
•5 3.62xlO~^ 1.95x10"
(1.23) (0.88) (1.13) (1.00) (1.07) (0.89) (0.16)
F.ducatlon 0.752 0.165 -4971.5 176.50 9.060 -2.570 -4.262
(2.03) (1.09) (3.20) (0.91) (6.28) (3.28) (1.86)
FeedBrnln
-0.784program 0.12R -0.116 670.0 -35.33 0.201 0.202
(0.58) (1.29) (0.70) (0.31) (0.23) (1.68) (0.15)
VJlioat
program -0.312 0.098 -2174.9 -3.577 -0.271 -0.457 0.973
(0.82) (0.61) (1.19) (0.02) (0.18) (0.56) (0.40)
Other:
Share F.o.
2 age 65 1.323 3.574 12977.71 4799.3 -17.42 -10.04 3.271
(1.17) (5.52) (1.73) (5.40) (2.02) (3.00) (0.34)
Selectivity 0.046 0.8J1 13816.2 -580.75 -3.535 -3.567 -7.024
(0.05) (2.04) (3.83) (1.20) (0.92) (1.76) (1.11)
D. 1.590 0.325 -2288.7 -520.96 1.885 -5.003 . -5.637
1
(2.32) (1.2.")) (1.60) (3.09) (0.76) (4.79) (1.30)
0.212 0.285 -2630.5 -133.84 -0.975 .1.396 -14.307
2
(0.45) (1.55) (.1.50) (1.52) (0.81) (1.34) (4.54)
Intercept -3.650 -2.564 -5810.75 -2607.5 -7.40 9.071 22.159
(2.33) (4.19) (1.25) (4.71) (1.26) (2.98) (2.25)
—ARymptotlc t-atntlntlc.n, coniiltiinici! on tlie Bclectivity variable, are
parcntlicflCH under the eBtimnte oC tlie coefficlcntB.
In
4-22-86
Table 3. Product Supply and Input Demand Elasticities: U.S. Cash Grain Farms,
42 States, 1949-1974^'
Elasticity with respect to normalized price of:.
' . ' Feed-
Quantity Fertilizer Fuel Machinery Labor Wheat Soybean grains
-Inputs:
Fertilizer -0..789- 0..292 0..260. -0,.077 -1,.126 0.,153 1..288
Fuel 0..428 -0..603 1..151 -0,.907 -0..288 -0..530 0,.749
Machinery o!.000^^ 0..000 0..067 0,.066 -0,.000 -0..000 -0..133
Labor -0,.000 -0,.000 0,.598 -0 .656 0,.001 0..000 0,.058
Output:
Wheat 0.487 0.085 1.240 -0.420 0.770 -1.626 -0.535
Soybean -0.125 0.297 0.606 -0.268' -3.037. 1.626 0.951
Feedgrain 1.487 0.669 0.519 -0.627 -1,262 -3.036 2.250
1
a/— Elasticities are computed using the estimated coefficients reported in
Table 1. The prices are sample mean values and the quantities are predicted
values evaluated at the sample mean.
—^The elasticity is smaller than 0.0005-
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Table 4. Implicit Shadow Values of Fixed Factors and Governmental Policy:
Effects on Variable Profit and Total Profit of U.S. Cash Grain
Farms, 1949-74
Land
Preseason
precipitation
Agricultural
research
Agricultural
extension
Farmers'
schooling
Commodity programs
Feed Grains
Wheat
Unit
change
$100/farm
inches/
season
$16,800
$48,300/year
14 weighted
yr/f.0.
.0352 $/bu.
.0629 $/bu.
Shadow values ($)
Variable profit Total profit
-$20.9
-141.7
0.114
0.157
-1.153
38.6
232.5
-$18.5
295.1
-0.167
-0.317
1,518
-4,647.1
21,804.2
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Table 5. Bias in Choices Induced Ky Changes in Fixed Factors and Government
Policy Variables: U.S. Cash Grain Farms, 1948-1974
Current Choices
a/" b/
Input: Output
government policy
\ "
Fertilizer Fuel Machinery
^ik
Labor VJheat Soybeans
Agricultural
research .270 .148 -.008 .071 -.516 .274.
Extension -.046 -.008 -.005 .047 -.087 .145
Education -1.058 -.643 .054 -.490 3.245 -2.795
Feed grain
program -.015 .058 -.002 .018 .,034 -.172
Wheat
program .047 .145 .010 -.077 -.127 -.271
Land .127 .181 -.004 .0^6 • -.125 . -.291
Preseason
precipitation -.032
i
-.247 .016 -.142 .450 .635
—positive (negative) sign indicates a bias in favor of (against) an
input.
—positive (negative) sign indicates a bias against (in favor of) an
output.
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